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Quantum bit seal is a way to encode a classical bit quantum mechanically so that everyone
can obtain non-zero information on the value of the bit. Moreover, such an attempt should have
a high chance of being detected by an authorized verifier. Surely, a reader looks for a way to
get the maximum amount of information on the sealed bit and at the same time to minimize
her chance of being caught. And a verifier picks a sealing scheme that maximizes his chance of
detecting any measurement of the sealed bit. Here, I report a strategy that passes all measurement
detection procedures at least half of the time for all quantum bit sealing schemes. This strategy also
minimizes a reader’s chance of being caught under a certain scheme. In this way, I extend the result
of Bechmann-Pasquinucci et al. by proving that quantum seal is insecure in the case of imperfect
sealed bit recovery.
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Introduction — We sometimes put an important doc-
ument, such as a will, in an envelop with sealed wax so
that others can open it only by breaking the wax. The
intactness of the wax seal, therefore, shows that the doc-
ument has not been opened. It is useful to extend the
concept of physical wax seal to the digital world. Yet, no
classical digital sealing scheme is unconditionally secure
as one can, in principle, copy all the bits without being
caught.
Recently, Bechmann-Pasquinucci explored the possi-
bility of sealing a classical bit quantum mechanically. In
her scheme, each bit of classical message is encoded as
three qubits out of which one of them is erroneous. Using
single qubit measurement along the standard basis plus
the classical [3, 1, 3]2 majority vote code, everyone can ob-
tain the original classical bit with certainty. Moreover, an
authorized verifier, who knows some extra information on
the erroneous qubit, may check if someone has extracted
the encoded classical bit with non-negligible probability
[1]. Following a similar line, Chau proposed quantum bit
seal based on quantum error correcting code that applied
to quantum messages [2]. Recently, Singh and Srikanth
[3] as well as He [4, 5] separately constructed quantum
seals by extending the Bechmann-Pasquinucci protocol in
different ways. In particular, He constructed a quantum
bit string seal [5].
The above five quantum sealing schemes can be divided
into two types. The first two are perfect quantum seals in
the sense that a reader can obtain the classical message
with certainty. The last three are imperfect for a reader
cannot do so accurately.
The density matrices used to encode any two distinct
classical messages in a perfect quantum seal must be or-
thogonal. Hence, one may devise a collective measure-
ment to read out the sealed message without disturbing
the encoded state. (A quantum computer may be re-
quired to perform the collective measurement though.)
This is precisely the idea used by Bechmann-Pasquinucci
et al. to prove the insecurity of all perfect quantum seals
[6]. However, their proof does not apply to imperfect
seals. Therefore, it is instructive to study the security
of imperfect seals. Recently, He analyzed the security of
imperfect quantum bit seals and proved certain bounds
regarding the information gain and the measurement de-
tection probability [7]. However, his bound is not tight.
In this Letter, I study the relation between the infor-
mation on the sealed bit obtained by a reader and the
probability of measurement detection by a verifier. In
particular, I find a cheating strategy that obtains non-
zero amount of information on the sealed bit but escapes
detection at least half of the time for all quantum bit
sealing schemes. Moreover, this strategy is optimal for a
certain bit sealing scheme in the sense that no strategy
with the same power of distinguishing the two sealed bits
has a higher chance of avoiding measurement detection
under that scheme. (Implementing this cheating strategy
may require a quantum computer.) Consequently, I con-
clude that all imperfect quantum bit seals are insecure.
Quantum Bit Seal — A quantum bit seal is a method
for Alice to encode a bit in such a way that any member
of the public, say Bob, can recover the original bit with
probability greater than a half. Moreover, any recovery
process must disturb the encoded state so that the intact-
ness of the state plays the role of a wax seal. By checking
its intactness, an authorized verifier may correctly detect
any measurement of the value of the sealed bit with a
certain non-zero probability. Without loss of generality,
one may assume that the encoded state i Alice prepared
is a pure state given by
|ψ˜i〉 =
∑
j
λij |ψij〉B ⊗ |φj〉A (1)
2for i = 0, 1, where |ψij〉’s are normalized states that are
not necessarily mutually orthogonal, and |φj〉’s are or-
thonormal states. (If the states prepared by Alice are
mixed, she can always purify them. More importantly,
the use of pure states increases the verifier’s chance to
detect a cheating Bob.) She makes the particles labeled
by the subscript “B” publicly accessible, and keeps those
labeled by the subscript “A” for authorized verifiers only.
So, from Bob’s point of view, the sealed state is either ρ0
or ρ1, where
ρi =
∑
j
|λij |2|ψij〉〈ψij | . (2)
The maximum achievable classical L1 distance between
probability distributions arising from measurements per-
formed on ρ0 and ρ1 is equal to the trace distance between
the two density matrices [8]
qmax = D(ρ0, ρ1) ≡ 1
2
Tr|ρ0 − ρ1| . (3)
The higher the value of qmax, the higher the chance for
Bob to correctly extract the sealed bit. In fact, a quan-
tum bit seal is perfect if qmax = 1; and it is imperfect if
0 ≤ qmax < 1. (Actually, the case of qmax = 0 is not a
quantum bit seal at all for it gives no information on the
original state.)
To gain information on the sealed state, Bob performs
a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) measure-
ment E on the publicly accessible state. The classi-
cal L1 distance between probability distributions aris-
ing from the measurement E on ρ0 and ρ1 equals q ≡
D(E(ρ0), E(ρ1)). From Alice’s point of view, the entire
entangled state becomes E ⊗ I(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|) ≡ E˜(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|).
Amongst all E whose measurement results on ρ0 and ρ1
have the same classical L1 distance q ∈ [0, qmax], Bob
would like to pick the one that minimizes the chance of
being detected by a verifier. Since it is equally likely for
the sealed bit to be 0 or 1 and the probability of catching
the reader Bob is at most equal to the fidelity of the re-
sultant state as |ψ˜i〉, Bob’s aim is equivalent to finding a
quantum operation E˜ = E⊗I that maximizes the average
fidelity
F¯ =
1
2
1∑
i=0
〈ψ˜i|E˜(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)|ψ˜i〉 ≡
〈
Tr[E˜(ρ˜i) ρ˜i]
〉
i
. (4)
On the other hand, Alice has the freedom to pick the seal-
ing scheme. Of course, she would like to choose the one
that minimizes F¯ . Consequently, the average fidelity for
the optimal cheating strategy minAlicemaxBob F¯ (q, qmax)
is found by first taking the maximum over all possi-
ble POVM measurements E used by Bob with q =
D(E ⊗ I(ρ˜0), E ⊗ I(ρ˜1)) for a given sealing scheme, and
then by taking the minimum over all quantum bit seals
with trace distance qmax chosen by Alice. Here, I prove
that
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯ (q, qmax) =
1 + q2max
2
+
1− q2max
2
(
1− q
2
q2max
) 1
2
(5)
for all 0 < q ≤ qmax and that
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯ (0, qmax) = 1 . (6)
The Optimal Cheating Strategy — Let me introduce
a few notations before reporting the optimal cheating
strategy that works for q > 0. (Note that this strategy
is optimal in the sense stated in the above paragraph.
That is to say, this is the best strategy for Bob to work
against the most stringent sealing scheme devised by Al-
ice. It is possible, however, to find a strategy with a
higher value of average fidelity if Alice uses a less strin-
gent scheme.) I write ρ0 − ρ1 = Q0 − Q1, where Qi’s
are positive operators with orthogonal support. Suppose
Π0 satisfying Π0Q0 = Q0 is a projector whose support
is orthogonal to that of Q1, and let Π1 = I − Π0 be its
complementary projector. (Clearly, these projectors ex-
ist and are non-zero if and only if qmax > 0. In addition,
these non-zero projectors are uniquely determined on the
support of ρ0+ ρ1 if and only if ρ0− ρ1 and ρ0+ ρ1 have
a common support.) Then, the classical L1 distance be-
tween probability distributions arising from the POVM
measurement with measurement operators {Π0,Π1} on
ρ0 and ρ1 equals qmax [8, 9]. By denoting
a = 〈ψ˜0|Π0 ⊗ I|ψ˜0〉 , (7)
one has
〈ψ˜0|Π1 ⊗ I|ψ˜0〉 = 1− a , (8)
〈ψ˜1|Π0 ⊗ I|ψ˜1〉 = a− qmax (9)
and
〈ψ˜1|Π1 ⊗ I|ψ˜1〉 = 1− a+ qmax . (10)
Clearly, qmax ≤ a ≤ 1.
For any fixed 0 < q ≤ qmax, let
M0 =
[
1
2
(
1 +
q
qmax
)] 1
2
Π0 +
[
1
2
(
1− q
qmax
)] 1
2
Π1
(11)
and
M1 =
[
1
2
(
1− q
qmax
)] 1
2
Π0 +
[
1
2
(
1 +
q
qmax
)] 1
2
Π1 .
(12)
Then M †
0
M0 + M
†
1
M1 = I. So, the operation Eq,qmax
given by
Eq,qmax(ρi) =M0ρiM †0 +M1ρiM †1 (13)
3is a POVM measurement with D(Eq,qmax(ρ0), Eq,qmax(ρ1))
= q. Bob applies this POVM measurement to the pub-
licly accessible quantum particles and deduces the value
of the sealed bit as i if the measurement outcome is i.
(Bob may require a quantum computer in order to im-
plement this measurement.)
From Eqs. (7)–(12), the probability of correctly deter-
mine the sealed bit equals
Pr =
〈
〈ψ˜i|M †iMi|ψ˜i〉
〉
i
=
1 + q
2
. (14)
Similarly, the average fidelity of the resultant state
caused by this cheating strategy is given by
F¯ (q) =
1
2
1∑
i,j=0
∣∣∣〈ψ˜i|Mj ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉∣∣∣2
=
1
2
1∑
i=0

 1∑
j=0
Tr (Πj ⊗ Iρ˜iΠj ⊗ Iρ˜i)
+ 2
(
1− q
2
q2max
)1/2
Tr (Π0 ⊗ Iρ˜iΠ1 ⊗ Iρ˜i)
]
= (1− 2a)(1 + qmax) + 2a2 + q2max − [2a2
+ (qmax − 2a)(1 + qmax)]
(
1− q
2
q2max
) 1
2
.(15)
Note that F¯ (q) attains its minimum value when a =
(1+qmax)/2. More importantly, from the construction of
Πi’s, Alice may force a to take on the value (1 + qmax)/2
by choosing |ψ˜i〉’s in such a way that the supports of ρ0−
ρ1 and ρ0+ρ1 agree and that 〈ψ˜0|Π0|ψ˜0〉 = (1+qmax)/2.
(Such |ψ˜i〉’s certainly exist. One possible choice is |ψ˜i〉 =
{[1 + (−1)iqmax]/2}1/2|0〉B + {[1− (−1)iqmax]/2}1/2|1〉B
for i = 0, 1.) Once Alice has picked such |ψ˜i〉’s, the av-
erage fidelity of the resultant state after applying the
POVM measurement Eq,qmax is
F¯ (q) =
1 + q2max
2
+
1− q2max
2
(
1− q
2
q2max
) 1
2
. (16)
This F¯ (q) sets the lower bound for the value of
minAlicemaxBob F¯ (q, qmax) in the case of q > 0.
The Proof Of Optimality — I prove the optimality of
the cheating strategy Eq,qmax by explicitly constructing a
quantum bit seal whose value of F¯ (q) is upper bounded
by the right hand side of Eq. (16) for any cheating strat-
egy used by Bob. I claim that
|ψ˜i〉 =
√
1− qmax
2
{[|0〉B + (−1)i|1〉B]⊗ |0〉A
+ [|0〉B − (−1)i|1〉B]⊗ |1〉A}
+ q1/2max|i〉B ⊗ |2〉A (17)
for i = 0, 1 is such a scheme.
Clearly, ρi = TrA(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|) = diag([1 + (−1)iqmax]/2,
[1− (−1)iqmax]/2). Thus, D(ρ0, ρ1) = qmax.
Recall that the most general measurement strategy for
Bob is to perform a POVM measurement with measure-
ment operators Nj ’s, where
Nj =
[
αj βj
γj δj
]
. (18)
To qualify as a POVM measurement whose measurement
results on ρ0 and ρ1 give probability distributions with
classical L1 distance q, one requires∑
j
(|αj |2 + |γj |2) = 1 =
∑
j
(|βj |2 + |δj |2) , (19)
∑
j
(αj β¯j + γj δ¯j) = 0 (20)
and
qmax
∑
j
∣∣|αj |2 + |γj |2 − |βj |2 − |δj |2∣∣ = 2q . (21)
The average fidelity of the state after applying Eq,qmax
equals
F¯ (q) =
1 + q2max
4
∑
j
(|αj |2 + |δj |2)
+
1− q2max
4
∑
j
(αj δ¯j + α¯jδj) . (22)
The constraint in Eq. (19) implies that∑
j
(|αj |2 + |δj |2) ≤ 2 . (23)
And by constrained maximization, one concludes that
∑
j
(αj δ¯j + α¯jδj) ≤ 2
(
1− q
2
q2max
) 1
2
. (24)
Consequently, F¯ (q) for this scheme is less than or equal to
the right hand side of Eq. (16). Therefore, the optimality
of Eq,qmax together with the validity of Eq. (5) are proven.
It remains to consider the case of q = 0. In this case,
Bob simply applies the identity operator to the state.
Hence, minAlicemaxBob F¯ (0, qmax) = 1. Note that the
positive operators Q0 and Q1 are non-zero if and only if
qmax > 0. The sudden change in the dimensions of Qi’s
is probably the reason why minAlicemaxBob F¯ (q, qmax) is
discontinuous at (0, 0).
Discussions — In short, I have studied the relation
between the information gain on the sealed qubit and
the probability of sealed bit measurement detection. In
4particular, I find a cheating strategy Eq,qmax whose prob-
ability of passing any measurement detection procedure
is greater than or equal to the right hand side of Eq. (16).
Since this probability is at least 1/2, I conclude that both
perfect and imperfect quantum bit seals are insecure.
This strategy reduces to the one used by Bechmann-
Pasquinucci et al. [6] in the case of a perfect seal. More
importantly, the cheating strategy Eq,qmax is optimal in
the sense that it has the least possible chance of being
detected by a verifier for the most stringent quantum bit
sealing scheme. Although all quantum states presented
in this Letter live in finite dimensional Hilbert spaces, the
arguments used in the proof are completely general and
are applicable also to states living in infinite dimensional
Hilbert spaces.
At least two lines of followup researches are worth to
conduct. One line is to investigate the security of imper-
fect quantum bit string seal. Although one may apply
the cheating strategy reported above to correctly read
out a single bit in any quantum bit string seal with a
small chance of being caught, the possibility (or impos-
sibility) of correctly determining the values of a large
proportion of bits without being caught remains unclear.
The other line of research is to look for a quantum bit
sealing scheme whose security is based on computational
(such as the inefficiency in computing Q0 and Q1) or
hardware (such as the hardness of building a quantum
computer) assumptions.
Lastly, I remark that there is an irreparable gap in
the “security proof” of the quantum seal in my earlier
manuscript in Ref. [2] — there is no way for Alice to
force Bob to measure the publicly accessible qubits indi-
vidually.
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